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Abstract 
Blumhagen, Robert J., November, 1994 
American Labor Union's Impact on the Success or Failure of 
Total Quality Management Systems (98 pp.) 
Chair: Dr. Gary Cleveland 
Transforming an organization to total quality management 
(TQM) is extremely difficult. Many researchers claim 
failure rates around 80% after two or three years. When 
both management and union officials jointly administer TQM 
systems, the probability of success and long-term commitment 
to continuous improvement should increase significantly. 
This paper is a comprehensive review of the current 
literature. It is augmented with perspectives from involved 
organizations and a case study. 
Many recent studies confirm that union/management 
partnerships in managing these programs is important for 
long-term survival. Unions that collaborate with management 
provide a structure for employee involvement not existing in 
non-union organizations or in union organizations where 
management unilaterally implements TQM. Institutionalizing 
TQM with formal labor agreements enhances the likelihood 
that companies and unions pursuing strong partnerships will 
be among the 2 0% who see their TQM efforts succeed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
Japanese firms began surpassing their American 
competitors in product quality in the 1970s. The emphasis 
on meeting or exceeding customer's needs was a result of Dr. 
W. Edwards Deming's and Dr. Joseph M. Juran's work with the 
Japanese following World War II. They both stressed the 
importance of quality, continuous improvement, trust, and 
employee participation in achieving a competitive advantage, 
Japanese automobile manufacturers gained substantial market 
share in the 1970's as a result of the OPEC oil embargo and 
the quality of their smaller fuel efficient vehicles. They 
produced a vehicle that met the American consumer's needs 
when U.S. manufacturers were still producing large fuel 
inefficient cars and trucks. 
Many articles began appearing in America's mainstream 
press about the Japanese management philosophy and work 
environment. In the United States, Ford, General Motors, 
Xerox and others began experimenting with "Quality of Work 
Life" programs (QWL) (Beer, et al, 1985). In many respects, 
total quality management is an extension of QWL. Both 
systems emphasize trust and employee empowerment. 
Union membership declined precipitously during the 
1980s (Noble, 1993) . It began when the Reagan 
administration busted the Air Traffic Controllers Union in 
1981. This action created a climate where organized labor 
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was placed on the defensive. Many American businesses began 
demanding major concessions during contract negotiations. 
Two entirely different strategies regarding labor relations 
were pursued by business. The first was an adversarial 
relationship where blatant attempts were made to oust the 
unions or close plants and re-locate to areas where union 
support was weak or move out of the country. The second 
path was one of cooperation and treating unions as business 
partners. 
Competitive business conditions during this time forced 
many organizations to re-evaluate their management 
practices. The dominant thrust has focused on total quality 
management (TQM). TQM requires a transformation of 
corporate culture in most organizations. The TQM philosophy 
focuses on the customer and employee empowerment where the 
worker who makes the actual product has more decision making 
authority and in many cases has direct contact with the 
customers (Juran, 1986) . This shift of responsibility has 
significant implications on labor/management relations. 
Organized labor's poor reputation got worse during the 
Reagan and Bush administrations. Some may argue that unions 
are responsible for the decline in American manufacturing 
and competitiveness. Strict work rules and specialized job 
classifications prevent the flexibility enjoyed by the 
Japanese. In recent years, some unions have agreed to 
loosen the prohibitive work restrictions and contract 
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language (Noble, 1993). 
Transforming an organization to total quality 
management is extremely difficult. Some researchers claim 
an 80% failure rate on these new systems (Bak, 1992). Some 
reasons for the high failure rate are lack of commitment 
from top management, shortage of employee "buy-in", and a 
view toward short-term success. This research project will 
evaluate relationships between unions and management and the 
likelihood of success when TQM and employee participation 
systems are implemented. If both union and management 
jointly administer TQM systems, the probability of success 
and long-term commitment to continuous improvement should 
increase significantly (Harrison, 1991, and Kelley and 
Harrison, 1992). In this scenario, both parties must 
compromise on adversarial contract provisions. When both 
parties are equally committed to the long-term success of 
TQM and employee participation systems, they can reduce the 
risk of being one of the 80% failures that attempt these 
programs. 
CHAPTER 2 
Me thodo1ogy 
This paper is a comprehensive review of the current 
literature. It is augmented with perspectives from involved 
organizations and a case study. 
Recent research articles are appearing that examine 
business success rates concerning TQM related employee 
participation systems and the relationships between unions 
and management. Interviews were conducted with the research 
division of the AFL-CIO of Washington, D.C., the American 
Society for Quality Control (ASQC) of Milwaukee, WI. , and 
the Industrial Relations Research Association at the 
University of Wisconsin, Madison. After these initial 
interviews, a questionnaire was developed and used to 
interview a company that is unionized and has implemented an 
employee participation system. Four individuals were 
interviewed, a company officer, an operations manager, a 
local union official, and a plant steward. Contacts were 
made by telephone. Each interview took between 45 minutes 
to one hour and 15 minutes. This anecdotal research 
contributes to the existing body of knowledge on jointly 
administered TQM efforts. 
The company was selected from five candidates. The 
candidates were selected from the U.S. Department of Labor's 
publication The New Work Systems Network: A Compendium of 
Selected Work Innovation Cases, 1990. Since a primary 
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purpose of this study was to examine the level of 
sustainability for more than a few years, this publication 
was an excellent source. Mid-size companies between 800-
1500 employees were selected. Smaller firms of less than 
800 employees may not have adequate resources to implement 
and sustain TQM properly. Larger companies with multiple 
unions would appear to have difficult logistical problems in 
starting participative programs. 
The company selected was Alladin Industries of 
Nashville, Tenn. Alladin was very enthusiastic about this 
project and went out of its way to accommodate my requests. 
CHAPTER 3 
Case Study 
Alladin employs 1400 people of which about 1000 are in 
the bargaining unit, Local 4802 of the United Steelworkers 
of America (USW). There are two divisions of Alladin: The 
Vacuum Bottle and Kerosene Lamp Division and Alladin 
Synergetics, Inc. The Synergetics division manufactures 
feeding systems for large institutions such as hospitals and 
prisons. The Vacuum Bottle and Kerosene Lamp division 
manufactures the Stanley thermos bottle and plastic thermal 
cups. The thermal cups are sold extensively for promotional 
purposes at convenience stores and are also a popular item 
on college and university campuses. These cups are custom 
printed for each respective customer. They are also sold 
generically through large retailers such as K-mart and 
WalMart. Interestingly, retailing the thermal cups to the 
general public was a result of their popularity in the 
institutional market. Hospitals reported that patients 
"stole" the cups and they couldn't keep them in stock. 
Alladin felt if they were so popular in that environment a 
strong marketing opportunity existed for the general public. 
A brief description of their various employee 
participation programs follows. There are several different 
group efforts in place at Alladin Industries. 
1) Production Cells: The plastics department has 
production cells with between 5-20 members depending on the 
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task. One management supervisor will have either two or 
three cells reporting to them. Production cells have a 
union "Set-up Person" who is responsible for ensuring that 
the machinery is performing within quality standards. If an 
operator notices the process is out of control, he/she 
reports to the set-up person who makes the necessary 
adjustments to the machine to bring it back in control. If 
the adjustment doesn't take care of the problem, the set-up 
person will report to the supervisor who decides if the 
process should be shut down. However, every person is 
responsible for quality on the shop floor and has the 
ability to stop a process if it is not meeting quality 
standards. 
2) Labor Management Committee; This group consists of 
both Management and Union Negotiating Committees and the USW 
district director from Atlanta. This group was started in 
1981 and meets half way through the life of the contract, 
about every three years, in what the company calls the Mid­
term Review. The purpose of the review is to discuss the 
concerns of both parties about the present labor agreement 
or any other items of interest. This meeting is held off-
site and usually lasts one day. Any item can be discussed 
at these meetings and if necessary task forces will be 
formed to achieve additional results. The contract is not 
officially altered as a result of these discussions, but 
corrective action is taken if both parties agree. The 
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contract language will be updated with the signing of the 
new agreement. Each contract lasts for three years. 
3) Quarterly Reviews: As a result of the success of the 
Mid-term Review, both parties agreed it would benefit 
everyone if management and hourly workers met more 
frequently. In 1981, a joint committee of union and 
management started attending trade shows. The company felt 
this would be an effective way of getting to know each other 
better. It also allows the hourly workers who actually make 
the product to meet the end user of the product. Management 
selects the supervisors and the union selects the hourly 
employees. Each trade show has a contingent of 6-8 people. 
The people attending trade shows become members of the 
Quarterly Review group in addition to both negotiating 
committees. There are 3-5 trade shows per year which the 
company/union attend. 
The biggest show. The AFL-CIO Union Industry Show, is 
open to the general public with attendance approaching 
250,000 people. Alladin was the first company to have 
hourly workers staff the booth in 1981. Most companies have 
sales representatives staff their booths but some have 
followed Alladin's lead and are now staffing booths with 
hourly workers. 
The company also sends representatives to the National 
Housewares Manufacturers Show, the American Dietetic 
Association Show, The Premium Show and the National 
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Association of Convenience Stores Show. Each person who 
attends a trade show is a member of the Quarterly Review 
group. Shortly after a show, a quarterly review is held to 
discuss what the group discovered. The members of the 
quarterly review are encouraged to communicate with fellow 
workers about the trade shows and the quarterly review 
meeting. The company gives the employees time off and pays 
for the trade show visits and for the quarterly and mid-term 
reviews. 
At the beginning of each new contract term, the 
quarterly review group consists of both negotiating 
committees and the group that attends the National 
Housewares Show, which precedes the contract signing. This 
group expands throughout the life of the contract with the 
addition of other trade show participants. At the end of 
the contract, the quarterly review group will consist of 
approximately 60-80 members. 
Alladin's management has been cautious in labeling any 
of their programs. The three mentioned above are the 
exceptions. They have purposely stayed away from labels 
such as Quality of Work Life, Total Quality Management, or 
Just-in-time. But Alladin's Human Resource practices 
parallel all of the programs promoting employee 
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participation. 
Alladin's experiences will be integrated throughout 
this paper. 
CHAPTER 4 
Historical Perspectives 
Quality innovator J.M. Juran, on May 24, 1994 at the 
Annual Quality Conference sponsored by the American Society 
for Quality Control, Inc., predicted that "future historians 
will refer to the 21st century as the Century of Quality" 
(Juran, 1994). If this is the case, many American 
businesses will need to abandon the mass production 
mentality that has dominated since the late 1800s. A new 
paradigm will be necessary which will have broad 
repercussions on labor/management relations. 
This current emphasis on quality has deep historic 
roots. The role of the craftsman as both manufacturer and 
inspector dates back to the European Middle Ages where craft 
guilds were highly structured with apprenticeship training, 
journeyman, and masters. Many of these craftsmen dealt 
directly with the customer and the quality of their products 
determined whether they remained in business. (Evans and 
Lindsay, 1993) . Craftsmen were important in early American 
history. Adam Smith published the Wealth of Nations in 1776 
and his principle of breaking industrial work into its 
simplest and most basic tasks was forerunner to mass 
production as we know it today. His philosophy was a 
reaction to "restrictions imposed on business and trade by 
medieval guilds and mercantilism of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries" (Collier's Encyclopedia, 1958). 
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The industrial revolution capitalized on Smith's 
philosophy and by the last half of the 1800s, U.S. 
manufacturing had shifted from an environment where skilled 
craftsmen were responsible for the quality of their product 
to one where unskilled labor predominated and managers and 
engineers determined the production processes. "The control 
styles of management in this country come out of low trust" 
(Covey, 1990) . This distrust sowed the seeds for early 
union organizing activities in this country. Lynn Williams, 
President of the United Steelworkers of America, contends 
that: 
"Steel craftsmen, who built the first union in 
the steel industry in the 18 90s, were, in many 
ways, the managers of the shop floor and, 
therefore, of production in that era. They 
functioned with pride in craft and product. 
These craftsmen's business was smashed by 
industrialists Andrew Carnegie and Henry Clay 
Frick, not because of the quality of their 
product--which made Carnegie and Frick among the 
wealthiest men in the world--but because these 
two men resented the increasing influence of the 
craftsmen" (Williams, 1993). 
Taylorism, or scientific management, was popularized 
around World War I and is still widely embraced today. 
Frederick Winslow Taylor described his approach to 
management this way: 
"The managers assume. . . the burden of 
gathering together all of the traditional 
knowledge which in the past has been processed by 
the workmen and then of classifying, tabulating, 
and reducing this knowledge to rules, laws and 
formulae. . . All possible brain work should be 
removed from the shop and centered in the 
planning or laying-out department [sic] (AFL-CIO, 
1994) . 
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Working conditions under this environment further encouraged 
union organizing efforts where workers sought protection 
against abusive employers. 
Taylorism flourished throughout American society during 
World War II in business practices, government 
organizations, educational systems, and military command and 
control structures. Millions of military personnel returned 
to civilian life firmly believing in the hierarchical 
structure where managers made decisions and workers carried 
out those decisions. 
Following the war, American businesses concentrated on 
producing mass volumes of goods to meet "an unparalleled 
demand for consumer goods. In addition, management and 
leadership skills learned in the military created an 
environment where Taylor's scientific management flourished" 
(Jackson and Frigon, 1994). American businesses were not 
concerned about quality until foreign competition, 
especially Japanese and German, began to increase market 
share in the 1970s. Our toughest competitors enjoyed 
distinct competitive advantages. The U.S. helped rebuild 
Japan's and Europe's infrastructure following WWII. Their 
manufacturing facilities were newer and the technology they 
utilized was more efficient. America's heavy manufacturing 
sector, especially steel and automobiles, were still 
producing in factories constructed around the turn of the 
century. Work processes were designed under the Taylor 
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model and new technological innovations were often opposed 
by powerful union officials. 
The OPEC oil embargo in 1973 proved to be a critical 
turning point in global competition. Higher gas prices led 
to an increased demand for more fuel efficient vehicles. 
The big three U.S. automakers were still producing large 
fuel inefficient cars and trucks while the Japanese and 
Germans produced quality fuel-efficient vehicles. American 
automakers were unable to produce the type of vehicles the 
consumer demanded. When they introduced smaller models, the 
quality didn't match their foreign competitors. Poor 
quality was widely blamed on lazy American workers and 
unions. Little attention was focused on the production 
process itself. According to W. Edwards Deming it is the 
process that is responsible for 85% of quality problems 
(Deming, 1975, and Costin, 1994). 
Numerous articles began appearing in the American press 
stressing quality and Japanese participatory management 
styles. Deming and Juran had worked extensively with 
Japanese manufacturers since WWII but received very little 
recognition for their successful efforts in the U.S. Most 
executives felt management practices in Japan were unique to 
their culture and would not work in America. "American 
society itself is characterized by individualism and 
adversarialism . . . Even our education system is premised 
on individual competition--not cooperation" (Kearney and 
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Hays, 1994). These articles in conjunction with declining 
market share and profits led to experiments in employee 
participation programs such as Employee Involvement (EI) , 
Quality of Work Life (QWL), Quality Circles (QC), Self-
Directed Work Teams (SDWT), Participative Decision Making 
(PDM) , and others which have evolved into today's popular 
term of Total Quality Management (TQM). The early attempts 
were designed to develop more positive attitudes among 
workers thus increasing their commitment to the products 
they produced. It was believed absenteeism and employee 
turnover would decline when workers had more say in their 
work environment. Workers were still identified as the 
source of the quality problem rather than the system itself. 
The 1980s produced a radical shift in public sentiment 
toward unions with the election of Ronald Reagan. In 1981, 
Reagan ousted the Air Traffic Controllers Union (ATCU) after 
making extensive campaign promises seeking their endorsement 
during the 1980 presidential campaign (Beer, et al, 1985). 
Reagan not only broke promises to the ATCU but established 
an anti-union environment, which permeated the 1980s. 
During the last three decades American businesses 
pursued three different labor relation strategies: union 
avoidance, cooperation or a mixed strategy. The union 
avoidance approach emphasized de-certification of bargaining 
units, introducing new technology to reduce the workforce, 
concession bargaining techniques which reduced the union's 
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power, opening new plants in right-to-work states, closing 
plants with unions, adamantly opposing any union organizing 
efforts, and replacing striking workers with no provisions 
for re-hiring the strikers (e.g.. Air Traffic Controllers). 
The cooperative approach incorporated a number of different 
employee involvement programs such as employee involvement, 
quality circles, self-directed work teams, and quality of 
work life programs. The mixed strategy combined cooperative 
efforts in unionized facilities and the union avoidance 
tactics in non-union facilities and new plant openings. 
Some bold experiments began emerging in the 1970's, 
specifically in the U.S. auto industry, called Quality of 
Work Life (QWL). These programs were based on the premise 
that employee involvement would lead to more satisfied 
workers which would translate to a more productive 
workforce. "The main impetus for employee involvement has 
been the declining competitiveness of American companies, 
primarily in the manufacturing sector" (Levine, 1992). Many 
of the experiments failed to obtain the desired results and 
were abandoned in a few years. Some, however, flourished 
and evolved into a corporate philosophy or culture. The new 
paradigm on employee empowerment is popularly called Total 
Quality Management (TQM). 
Dr. A. V. Feigenbaum first coined the term total 
quality control when he published the book Total Quality-
Control (TQC) in 1961. In the book he emphasized "that all 
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functions of the company must join their efforts to build 
quality into its products instead of 'inspecting' quality 
in" (Jackson and Frigon, 1994). Control in the name of the 
system was replaced by Management over the years because 
control was so closely aligned with Taylorism, which is 
identified today "with bureaucratic efficiency without a 
human face, a deadening science that undermines quality 
rather than creating it" (Waxier and Higginson, 1992) . 
TQM's basic premise is meeting or exceeding customers' 
expectations. There are two types of customers, external 
customers who eventually buy the product, and internal 
customers who transform the product in the next step of the 
process. Under TQM, employees are empowered. Employees are 
responsible for the quality of their products. When 
products don't conform to quality standards the process is 
either shut down or the product is rejected. Each 
organization must tailor TQM for its own unique situation 
but some fundamental beliefs apply: 
Each company adapts the primary principles to 
fit their unique culture, but there are several 
elements common to all TQM programs: 
1) a focus on the customer; 
2) continuous improvement based on measurements; 
3) preventing rather than detecting errors; 
4) top management commitment and involvement; 
5) strategic business focus on quality; and 
6) employee involvement (Levine, 1992). 
Such programs are difficult to sustain for very long. 
Many researchers claim TQM systems surviving more than five 
years range between approximately 20-30% (Bak, 1992, 
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Huszczo, 1991, and Jacob, 1993). Perhaps the greatest 
reason for these high failure rates is that TQM cannot be 
treated as management's latest program-of-the-month or be 
implemented in a cookie cutter fashion. TQM requires a 
total change in philosophy about how workers and management 
relate with each other and how they might compete more 
effectively in the global marketplace. In other words, a 
transformation of the corporate culture is needed. 
The heavily unionized manufacturing sector has suffered 
the most economic difficulty from foreign competition in the 
past twenty years. In order to succeed against increasing 
foreign competition both management and organized labor need 
to re-evaluate their historically adversarial relationship. 
For both to survive in the 21st Century of Quality each 
party must develop a new paradigm, a new way of conducting 
business. 
CHAPTER 5 
The Need for Change 
As major U.S. industries experienced a continual 
decline in market share, the decade of the 1980s saw a 
tremendous interest in the quality phenomenon "by customers, 
industry, and government" (Evans and Lindsay, 1993). In 
1984, the federal government proclaimed October as National 
Quality Month. The Malcolm Baldridge Award was established 
by an act of Congress in 1987 to honor U.S. firms committed 
to quality leadership. Work systems were introduced in new 
American facilities modelled after Japanese management 
styles which empowered employees (Rubinstein, 1993). In an 
effort to survive, both management and organized labor 
started re-evaluating their traditional roles in the 
collective bargaining relationship. 
To facilitate discussion about work environment 
experimentation, in 1990 the U.S. Department of Labor 
published an extensive book entitled The New Work Systems: A 
Compendium of Work Innovation Cases. This book profiled 
approximately 400 companies involved in cooperative efforts 
with employees. It listed companies within industries, by 
unions, and by geographic regions and how they approached 
employee involvement programs. 
To compete effectively in the global marketplace during 
the Century of Quality, business will require the 
flexibility in work processes to respond quickly to 
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customer's demands and competitor's marketing strategies. 
Flexibility translates into reduced set-up time in 
production processes, broader skills and knowledge required 
of workers, faster product introduction time, and more 
relaxed job definitions in union environments. The 
bureaucratic systems so well entrenched by Taylorism don't 
lend themselves to flexibility. Economies of scale in 
manufacturing were proving too costly. Huge inventory 
build-ups occurred when the economy slowed as a result of 
mass production of certain model types in the auto industry. 
Designing and introducing new models took several years in 
the U.S. auto industry. The Japanese were introducing new 
models in about half the time. 
New technology and products are being introduced at a 
record pace creating many problems for global competitors. 
Highly successful products are being replaced in the growth 
period of their product-life-cycle by new versions with more 
amenities or alterations requested by consumers. Since it 
was introduced in 1979 Sony Corporation developed 227 
different models of the "Walkman" or a new model every three 
weeks. Competition for shelf space has never been more 
aggressive than it is today. Tom Peters claimed, "there 
were 16,143 new drug and grocery store consumer products 
introduced in 1991, up from 2,689 in 1980. The average 
supermarket now carries 30,000 items versus 9,000 in 1976" 
(Peters, 1992). Computer software and operating system 
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upgrades are introduced incessantly. 
This rapid paced environment of global competition 
requires a workforce which is able to adjust to competitive 
pressures quickly and the ability to produce quality 
products. To accomplish this, many organizations have 
revised their systems but have failed to abandon Taylorism. 
Many U.S. firms have responded to the 
pressures of increased competition by attempting 
to make mass production more flexible. Flexible 
mass production retains hierarchial management 
structures, old power relations between managers 
and workers, separation of conception and 
execution, relatively high use of low- or narrow-
skilled workers, and the routinization of work 
(Applebaum and Batt, 1993) . 
Many early efforts at TQM were unilaterally implemented 
by management. Eaton found that 73 of 86 participation 
programs in unionized companies in 1987, were initiated by 
management (Eaton, 1990). Most union leaders were reluctant 
to give official union endorsements to these programs. 
Leaders feared they might be viewed by the rank and file as 
selling out to management and undermining the viability of 
the union's role in the collective bargaining process. In 
the case of Ford Motor Co., which had been experimenting and 
expanding their Quality of Work Life System since the early 
1970s, management and unions were forging partnerships in 
the management of these programs. 
For organizations to fully capitalize on their workers' 
experience, education, and intelligence, management must 
change its long standing method of organizing work and begin 
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to empower employees. "The traditional system of work 
organization is built on mutual distrust; that is why it 
relies on a hierarchical command-and-control regime" (AFL-
CIO, 1994). Employee empowerment and collaboration requires 
an environment of trust and cooperation. 
"Companies generally agree that the Taylor system is 
obsolete and should be replaced, but don't agree on what 
should replace it" (Juran, 1994). The historical 
adversarial approach between workers and management "is 
essentially obsolete, rendered inappropriate by today's 
mutual requirement for better productivity and a more 
successful battle against foreign competition" (Gilmour, 
1992) . 
Management itself may provide the greatest obstacle to 
accomplishing a more flexible work environment. All layers 
of management have power bases established on the extent of 
span of control and information. When each worker is 
responsible for quality and has the necessary information to 
make decisions, the foundation of the power base is severely 
eroded. Many of the failed attempts at TQM are a result of 
mid-level manager's and first-line supervisor's direct 
subversion of the programs and top management's lack of 
commitment and follow through to ensure all layers of 
management are "walking the walk." Top management must be 
fully committed to a new philosophy in worker/management 
relations if the new work systems are to succeed. 
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The sharp decline in union membership during the 1980s 
presented union officials with many problems. Companies 
were introducing new technology to lower labor costs by 
displacing workers. When management discussed the impact of 
global competition with union leaders, "most unions 
dismissed employers' demands for change as the same old 
handwringing by fat-cat bosses" (Bernstein, 1994). As 
membership declined, many unions were reluctant to organize 
new industries or non-union facilities because of their 
declining public image and the expense involved. Slowly, 
some union leaders began to see cooperation with management 
as an opportunity to stabilize or increase memberships. 
Unfortunately, "most collaborative efforts appear to be 
formed only when the company's well-being and employees' job 
security have been or are about to be threatened by 
competition" (Cooke, 1990). 
At Alladin the motivation for change was a result of a 
three day wild-cat strike in March 1973 followed by a twenty 
three week contract strike beginning in January 1974. All 
of the individuals interviewed at Alladin went through this 
experience. Both company and union officials described a 
horrible situation where long time friends turned on each 
other, hourly workers were fired, and customer service and 
quality deteriorated. Tom Bryant, Director of Human 
Resources, said, "It screwed up an already screwed up 
relationship. It damn near ruined the company and damn near 
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ruined the union." Joe Russell, present Union President, 
stated, "Prior to the strike, each side tried to prove who 
was stronger. Union leaders were fighting the company all 
the time. It was us against them." 
Following the 1974 strike at Alladin, two groups 
emerged within the Steelworkers local. One faction, headed 
by the elected union leaders, wanted to continue the 
adversarial relationship. Another faction wanted a 
different environment. At the next election, according to 
Russell, "the vote wasn't even close. Only a small minority 
didn't want change." 
Another reason for changing the work environment is 
strictly for financial reasons. Juran estimated, that 
"quality improvement projects provide a higher return on 
investment than virtually any other investment." With 
initial outlays between $5,000 to $20,000 to diagnose the 
cause of the problem and identify its remedy, large 
organizations with sales of $1 billion or more will, on the 
average, yield cost reductions of $100,000 on quality 
improvement projects (Juran, 1986) . Ironically, many 
companies do not provide the necessary resources or lack the 
commitment for quality improvement. Juran also classifies 
four types of costs associated with poor quality. First, 
internal failure costs that are incurred prior to shipping 
products to customers. Second, external failure costs 
associated with product defects after shipping to the 
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customer. Third, appraisal costs that identify the 
condition of products and raw materials. And fourth, 
prevention costs associated with preventing defects and 
limiting failure and appraisal costs (Juran, See Appendix A: 
Juran's Categories of Quality Costs). Philip Crosby states, 
"Quality is free. . . What costs money are the unquality 
things--all the actions that involve not doing jobs right 
the first time" (Crosby, 1979). 
Deming attributes causes of variation which lead to 
lost sales and high costs under two categories: 
1) Faults in the System that account for 85% of products 
not conforming to quality standards. These faults are 
designed into the system and will never be corrected unless 
management directly addresses system design. 
2) Special Causes that are specific to a certain worker or 
machine. The operator can usually identify and correct such 
causes. These account for 15% of non-conforming products 
(Deming, 1975). 
Management must recognize its responsibility for 
correcting the system and building quality in, rather than 
inspecting for quality and blaming workers for sub-standard 
products. Only then are they likely to seek input from the 
workers who actually perform the tasks. "Implementing 
empowerment in an ongoing operation is more difficult 
because of the need to change the old autocratic structure 
and control practices" (Rubinstein, 1993). Dispelling long 
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standing antagonistic attitudes takes time. However, if 
this new relationship can be created it should break the 
traditional mass production mentality and replace it with an 
attitude where every employee is concerned about producing 
quality products. 
As companies move away from the Taylor model, 
management may embrace the concept "that labor is an 
important human agent in the formulation and control of the 
production process" and seek the cooperation of union 
leaders and their members (Waxier and Higginson, 1992). 
Ignoring the importance of labor has created "a profound 
sense of mistrust that has often led to lower productivity 
and poor quality at a time when increased productivity and 
high quality are often the only way for a company to 
survive" (Waxier and Higginson, 1992). According to Owen 
Bieber, President of the UAW, "world class quality can only 
be achieved when workers have a genuine voice in decisions 
that affect the quality of products and services" (Bieber, 
1993) . 
Managers must determine how their organizations can 
sustain TQM beyond the two to three year time frame. When 
continuous improvement is one of the primary objectives for 
implementation, management must create an environment where 
TQM philosophy becomes a way of life not just another 
faddish program. Key elements of that philosophy are trust 
and commitment. To "walk the walk" both unions and managers 
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should pursue a joint partnership in managing TQM systems, 
otherwise they are just paying it lip service. 
CHAPTER 6 
Transforming Culture 
America's approach to labor relations is unique in the 
global marketplace. Our approach to organized labor has 
been adversarial in most cases. In comparison, our 
strongest competitors, the Japanese and Europeans have 
universally recognized trade unions as an integral part of 
running a business. Labor councils are established through 
governmental legislation and are key participants in hiring 
practices, work rules and capital investment decisions. 
Unions and management work cooperatively with one another 
and have not relinquished their traditional power bases. 
"[E]very Western European country except Britain and Ireland 
has a legally mandated second channel, such as works 
councils. . . These groups, usually elected by employees, 
provide input into making managerial decisions" (Bernstein, 
1994). In Japan, companies with communist labor unions 
commonly experience "mental and physical disturbances." 
(Matsuo, 1983). Unions are guaranteed that right under 
Japanese labor law which was originally drafted under the 
supervision of General Douglas McArthur. However, each 
party recognizes that prosperity for the company is in the 
long-term interest of each and "most union members have an 
underlying trust in the company and usually consider the 
general welfare of the entire company before they present 
their demands" (Matsuo, 1983). 
33 
34 
In the U.S., "few American managers have ever accepted 
the right of unions to exist, even though that's guaranteed 
by the 193 5 Wagner Act" (Bernstein, 1994). Most managers 
feel threatened by unions and believe if their companies are 
unionized they will be unable or strictly limited to manage 
their business effectively. Union organizing drives are a 
stinging commentary on past management practices and an 
indictment of certain managers. 
Recently, there has been a slow shift from adversarial 
relationships. At the 1993 Malcolm Baldridge National 
Quality Award Ceremony, President Clinton in addressing the 
winners said: 
All of the success stories have a common 
theme: The companies listen to the needs of their 
customers and to the ideas of their workers. The 
companies streamline their operations and adopt 
the idea of continuous improvement in products 
and services. They manage from the top down and 
from the bottom up. This is better known now as 
quality management (Bemowski, 1994) . 
There has been a split between managers and workers in 
this country ever since the industrial revolution. It has 
been documented by novelists, song writers, social 
scientists, and political commentators. The divide has been 
described as: "thinkers and doers, capitalists and 
proletarian workers, skilled and unskilled workers, master 
and servant" (Beer, et al, 1985). This attitude has led to 
the development of two cultures in most organizations. 
These two cultures have typically been adversarial and 
distrustful toward each other. "Union leaders and their 
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counterpart labor relations managers have their own culture" 
(Evans and Lindsay, 1993). Total Quality Management is an 
attempt to create single culture organizations, which breaks 
down these traditional animosities. 
Professor William N. Cooke of Wayne State University 
identified four fundamental problems organizations must 
overcome when unions and management attempt to implement and 
sustain TQM over the long-term. They are: problems of 
distrust between the parties, insufficient commitment from 
management or union members, demoralization of workers and 
managers, and the balancing of cooperation with the more 
traditional collective bargaining relationship (Cooke, 
1991) . 
The first major impediment to overcome is distrust. 
The two different cultures present in most organizations 
were probably developed when the company was founded. These 
cultures need to come together to create a common culture 
which is mutually beneficial to both parties. Many union 
leaders believe that employee participation programs are a 
direct threat to their existence. Some unions have resisted 
involvement in these efforts out of fear that the company is 
attempting to subvert traditional union roles by changing 
work "schedules, assignments, and job classifications or by 
usurping grievance procedures and union authority in 
resolving grievances" (Cooke, 1992). To overcome these 
long-standing attitudes, astute managers should involve 
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union leaders early in the process and proceed slowly on 
substantive issues, sending clear signals they can be 
trusted. "[A] true collaborative effort cannot be 
undertaken if at the same time the company is pursuing union 
busting tactics or other actions perceived to dilute the 
strength of the union" (Levine, 1992). Hostilities 
developed over many years cannot be changed overnight. 
Alladin management and the newly elected union 
officials wanted to avert what led to the 1974 strike. The 
union recommended a forum to develop better communication. 
The Mid-Term Review was formed in an attempt to address each 
side's concerns. Both negotiating committees began meeting 
at off-site locations. An open dialogue developed and the 
1977 contract was signed four months prior to expiration. 
Commitment is the second obstacle to overcome. For TQM 
to be more than the program-of-the-month, top managers must 
be thoroughly committed to a fundamental change in their 
management techniques. They must discard the short-term 
outlook, so prevalent in U.S. companies over the past 
several decades, and realize that TQM efforts "may easily 
take five to ten years to implement properly during which 
time setbacks are likely to occur" (Sharp, 1991). Top 
management must recognize that TQM will result in a 
fundamental change in the organization and "the failure to 
implement it correctly can leave a company much worse off 
than it was before it even considered the process" (Niven, 
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et al, 1993) . 
CEOs must become active and visible participants who 
promote quality planning on an equal basis with financial 
and market planning. They must realize that if global 
competitors are producing goods and services of higher 
quality than theirs, all the financial and market planning 
will be worthless. The CEO needs all levels of management 
to be equally committed to the process. Adequate resources 
must be allocated for training. Before committing to TQM, 
all of the firm's top executives, including the CEO, should 
receive extensive training (Gilbert, 1992, and Ferguson, 
1993) . These individuals must be fully aware of the 
potential risk involved with such a radical departure from 
traditional management styles. The CEO should be intimately 
aware of Juran's seven nondelegable roles of top management 
(See Appendix B: CEO's Nondelegable Roles). 
"Management's treatment of management often becomes the 
crucial determinant of whether the 'culture' of the 
organization truly changes. . . Middle level managers have 
subtly sabotaged more EI efforts than perhaps any other 
group" (Huszczo, 1991) . Most managers must genuinely change 
their ideologies and values. "Actions must replace words. . 
. Too often leaders are more capable of saying the words 
than changing their behavior" (Huszczo, 1991). 
The third hurdle facing cultural transformation is 
demoralization. Early in the process, numerous inefficient 
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and wasteful practices are easily identified and corrected. 
These are usually minor adjustments in processes which 
increase productivity and save money. Workers have probably 
been aware of these for some time but had never been asked 
how to improve the system. As the TQM process advances, 
methods for continuous improvement become more difficult to 
identify and may involve numerous departments. Cross-
functional teams are established and solutions become more 
complex and time consuming. In many cases, management has 
unrealistic expectations and time tables to achieve certain 
goals. Believing that every group should and must succeed 
is unrealistic. Early champions of TQM may leave the 
organization without a sufficient foundation developed to 
ensure continual enthusiasm for the process. 
The fourth obstacle is combining joint efforts with 
traditional collective bargaining. These two activities are 
inherently in conflict, with deep historical roots. The 
unions' traditional role of protecting its members from 
harsh management practices must continue. Cooperation 
doesn't imply grievances will be eliminated, nor does it 
mean that unions will forfeit their right to strike. 
However, both sides can agree to disagree but still work in 
an environment of cooperation. 
Traditional bargaining relations exist at Alladin but 
the trust developed over the years has led to reduced 
grievances. Both parties tend to address issues immediately 
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and seek acceptable resolution. Charlotte Harris, Chair of 
Union Grievance Committee, said they try to resolve 
differences before the complaint is officially filed in the 
form of writing. 
The high failure rate of TQM after a few years may be 
due to the lack of initial agreement by unions to actively 
participate. Unilateral implementation by management is 
risky. United Auto Workers (UAW) Vice President Irving 
Bluestone warned, "Unless the union is involved as an equal 
partner, these programs amount to paternalism. Whatever 
management gives, management can take away" (Beer and 
Spector, 1985) . After the initial burst of successes in 
cooperation programs, problems become increasingly complex 
and momentum is difficult to maintain. Many people lose 
interest or become frustrated and the programs slowly die. 
In non-union environments, successful TQM efforts usually 
hinge on a few key leaders. When these people are promoted 
or leave there may not be adequate interest to continue the 
effort. 
Each cooperative effort has to be uniquely designed for 
each situation. "TQM is not a one-size-fits all program. 
It needs to take conditions at each company into account" 
(Niven, et al, 1993). When General Motors (GM) and the UAW 
agreed to cooperate at the national level, both "carefully 
avoided imposing any set QWL package or program on the local 
plants" (Beer, et al, 1985). 
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The most common starting point for implementing TQM is 
the appointment of a top level steering committee or 
council. The CEO should play a major role in this group. 
This group becomes responsible for formulating and 
coordinating the activity throughout the company (Juran, 
1986). "The most effective systems include union 
representatives and managers in these coordinating groups" 
(Rubinstein, 1993). By involving the union, communication 
channels are improved, in all directions, throughout the 
company. The union can facilitate worker buy-in more 
effectively than management. Unions often have more 
credibility with their members than management has and can 
legitimize employee involvement programs in the eyes of 
workers (Stuart, 1993, and Bahr, 1993). The steering 
committee oversees the creation of the infrastructure, 
establishes goals, allocates the resources and ensures top 
management commitment. 
The "infrastructure includes the facilities, personnel, 
training, systems, and core competencies. . . Required for 
implementing the policies and guidelines" (Jackson and 
Frigon, 1994). Union involvement in these efforts "provide 
a check on managers and owners who waver in their commitment 
to the new work order or who seek to revert to old ways" 
(AFL-CIO, 1994). Middle managers and first-line supervisors 
are naturally anxious about these new work systems and 
perceive them as a threat to their historic "authority. 
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power, and status" (Cooke, 1991) . The traditional structure 
of tasks, departments, and divisions should be "supplemented 
to enable it to meet strategic quality needs" (Juran, 1986). 
Initial goal setting can be problematic from the 
standpoint that goals based on historic performance may not 
be appropriate in the new model. "This practice has tended 
to perpetuate the sins of the past" (Juran, 1986). 
Allocating sufficient resources for extensive training 
is crucial. Training for quality in the hierarchial 
organization has normally been concentrated on quality 
managers and engineers. In a collaborative system, training 
must involve all functions. Workers must learn and feel 
confident with the seven quality training tools as well as 
understanding the philosophy of continuous improvement and 
employee empowerment. "The expenses of training as well as 
the wages for people attending meetings rather than working 
on the production line can become quite large" (Huszczo, 
1991). Applebaum and Batt found that two highly successful 
participative programs at Corning and Xerox spent huge sums 
on training employees. In the implementation phase at 
Corning, training costs ran as high as 23 percent of 
payroll. Xerox spent, on trainers alone, $9 million in 
1985, and valued the entire time employees spent in training 
over a three year period at $70 million (Applebaum and Batt, 
1993) . 
Upper management leadership may involve revising 
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managers incentive plans to coincide with quality-
objectives. Managers will become facilitators and coaches 
and will need to be evaluated on different criteria. Groups 
or teams will be responsible for the organization's success, 
not "star" performers. With regard to union/management 
relations. Bill Cooper, Vice President of Operations at 
Alladin, stated, "Our livelihood depends on how you perform 
as a group not against each other." Breakthroughs in process 
improvements need to be communicated throughout the 
organization and be used as role models for other groups or 
teams. 
Certain individuals will be skeptical of such far 
reaching shifts in the company's culture. Top management 
must be totally committed, involved and visible. Lower 
level managers and supervisors will follow the examples of 
their superiors. Managers involved in successful 
participative cultures point out that training is essential 
to teach executives down the line how to empower employees 
(Brown, 1992). For all of the workers to become active 
participants, management should invite union leaders to help 
plan and administer the program. Treating them as equal 
partners will enhance management's credibility with the rank 
and file. "[T]he unions interest must be the long-term 
viability of the company because this provides for job 
security for members and ensures an adequate retirement 
income in the future" (Sharp, 1991). 
CHAPTER 7 
Training, Sharing Information and 
Transferring Knowledge 
Training individuals in empowerment and participatory 
decision making skills is management's responsibility. 
Adequate resources must be allocated in the earliest phases 
of TQM implementation. "Training or lack of it is part of 
the system. Training can be improved only by management, 
certainly not by the workers" (Deming, 1975). Many 
executives who embarked on TQM stress the importance of top 
management training before implementing the system (Gilbert, 
1992). The executive steering committee must be fully 
committed to this new philosophy or it won't work. "One 
shot training sessions aimed at changing styles that 
represent years of habits just don't have much effect" 
(Huszczo, 1991). 
This new participative model requires different skills 
than the traditional hierarchial system. Management must 
demonstrate their sincerity through their own actions and 
union leaders must respond in kind. Many executives covet 
the end result of TQM but are not capable of actually 
dealing with the dilemmas associated with relinquishing 
power to the workers. Certain individuals can talk the talk 
but not walk the walk. "A dude is a person who can dress 
like a cowboy, but can't ride a horse. . . Actions must 
replace words. . . Too often leaders are more capable of 
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saying the words than changing their behaviors" (Huszczo, 
1991). Rubbermaid's CEO Wolfgang Schmitt stated "I've had 
to visibly be part of it. People look to see if you just 
talk about it or actually do it" (Jacob, 1993) . 
Once top management has decided to embrace TQM 
philosophy, middle managers and supervisors must receive 
appropriate training. Empowerment implies trust. The role 
of the manager/supervisor "requires skills above and beyond 
the skills needed to perform such roles in the traditional 
manner" (Huszczo, 1991). A fundamental element of TQM is 
the recognition by management that 85% of quality problems 
are attributable to the system. The system is the 
responsibility of management. Participatory management, in 
many ways, is contradictory to American business practices. 
We preach and practice democracy in our society but leave it 
behind at the corporate gate. Taylorism prevails even when 
most people are bored with their jobs. Taylorism and rugged 
individualism are "diametrically opposed to communal 
decision making and power" (Brown, 1992). 
Juran said that one broad corporate training program 
appropriate for all employees should be designed, "but with 
provision for plugging in special case examples as 
warranted" (Juran, 1986) . Attempting to fine tune training 
for each area in the company isn't necessary. This approach 
should help facilitate a common culture in the organization 
with every person receiving the same basic message. 
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Training should focus on team-building, problem solving, 
communication skills, cooperation and the seven quality-
tools. These include flowcharts, check sheets, histograms, 
pareto diagrams, cause-and-effect diagrams, scatter 
diagrams, and control charts (Evans and Lindsay, 1993). 
Not all employees want to be empowered because they are 
either "not trained to make decisions or they are afraid of 
the risks involved" (Niven, et al, 1993). Training workers 
on the seven quality tools, especially statistical process 
control, assists workers in identifying machines needing 
adjustment and whether incoming materials and parts conform 
to quality standards. When workers are exposed to these 
concepts and put them to practice, decision making skills 
and confidence levels will increase. "If the union is to 
fulfill its role as an equal partner in increasing 
productivity, improving quality, and lowering costs, it must 
have the knowledge to participate effectively" (Sharp, 
1991). 
Many firms have refined their training programs to 
just-in-time practices. This method provides training to 
workers when they actually need it. One company. Analog 
Devices, experimented with half of its 900 employees 
receiving standard classroom training while the other half 
received team training on the job. "Less than 40% of the 
first group felt they had actually put their learning to 
work, while 80% of those trained as teams did" (Jacob, 
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1993). Typically in unionized settings, management 
attendance at training sessions is required while the 
participation of hourly workers was voluntary. The hourly 
workers have generally participated more enthusiastically 
than many expected. At GM, "participation ran between 90 
and 99 percent (Beer, et al, 1985). 
There are two basic types of teams: functional and 
cross-functional (Jackson and Frigon, 1994). Functional 
teams consist of workers doing the same type of job for a 
certain process where cross-functional team members 
contribute to the same process but have different jobs in 
different departments. TQM and employee participation 
focuses on processes and how to make each one the most 
efficient. "As key processes begin to prevail over 
functions, organizational structures and internal boundaries 
are being redrawn, and the results are improved service 
quality and shorter cycle times" (Bak, 1992). When teams 
improve process efficiencies, these successes should be 
widely publicized as model programs. The knowledge of how 
it was accomplished should be shared with other teams so 
they might benefit from the experience. 
Many organizations transfer this knowledge either 
verbally, in company newsletters, posting on bulletin 
boards, internal memoranda, group meetings, or a combination 
of these. There has been a great deal of attention paid 
recently to knowledge transfer or sharing of information. 
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"[W]hen an organization reengineers itself around 
information, the majority of management layers becomes 
redundant. Most turn out to have been just information 
relays. Now, each layer has much more information 
responsibility" (Harris, 1993). Traditionally, knowledge 
has been equated with power and for that reason many 
managers withheld it from contemporaries. In the emerging 
global marketplace, "power comes from transmitting 
information to make it productive, not hiding it" (Harris, 
1993). Knowledge should not be confused with data. 
Companies successfully sharing information within their 
organizations try to focus on what information they need to 
serve their customers. (Harris, 1993) Some businesses are 
developing formal structures to ensure pertinent information 
is catalogued and readily available to anyone who needs it. 
The personal computer has contributed to this phenomenon. 
Individuals are discovering that the sharing of one idea can 
lead to input from numerous sources improving the initial 
concept. The computer also allows a number of individuals 
to access the same file simultaneously, unlike capturing 
information on paper, storing it in a file, and passing it 
on sequentially after each task is completed (Hammer and 
Champy, 1993) . Any number of people can work on the same 
project at the same time providing better service to the 
customer. Knowledge data banks are becoming formalized in 
many companies. They allow individuals to gain from others' 
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experiences. When knowledge is shared with team members and 
others in the organization the company achieves greater 
workplace flexibility. 
Another strategy in training and knowledge transfer is 
to hold certain types of training in abeyance until the 
business experiences economic downturns. "An organization 
that implements quality systems properly should recognize 
the value of training as a way of filling in the inevitable 
valleys in the business cycle" (Rubinstein, 1993). When 
production requirements diminish, employees receive 
pertinent training which facilitates greater flexibility 
when production demands increase. Training of this nature 
increases two important aspects of the employee's 
relationship with the company--mutual respect and trust 
(Rubinstein, 1993). It is extremely difficult for many 
firms to obtain skilled workers "in view of the lack of 
national training standards or programs for training and 
retraining the 70 percent of workers without college 
degrees" (Applebaum and Batt, 1993) . Training existing 
employees, rather than laying them off, during downturns 
could be cost effective and develop the committed workforce 
companies desire. 
Employees involved in collaborative efforts need 
pertinent information to make informed decisions. 
Withholding information resorts to paternalistic practices 
that Irving Bluestone was concerned about in the QWL program 
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pursued by General Motors. QWL was initially proposed by 
the UAW but was rejected by GM. Many GM executives felt the 
program was a sell-out to the union. Ironically, whoever 
finally agrees to collaboration, participation, or joint 
administration of these programs is viewed by their 
colleagues as surrendering to the enemy. Who is the enemy? 
Our global competitors or our workforce or management? When 
unions are truly involved in joint administration of the 
programs, pertinent information must be exchanged between 
the parties. The concept of empowerment rings hollow if 
this fundamental ideology is not adhered to. Selectively 
supplying information to the other party undermines respect 
and mutual trust, it's not consistent with the principals of 
TQM. Unions can establish the checkpoints in information 
transfer more effectively than coinciding efforts in non­
union environments. Union leaders normally have better 
access to top management than their non-union counterparts 
in TQM systems. At Alladin information is shared with union 
officials at the Quarterly and Mid-term Reviews. Alladin is 
privately held and does not release profit and loss 
statements but does share production and sales reports by 
manufacturing areas on percentage comparisons to previous 
years, reports on competitors, and information on major 
developments in manufacturing processes and new technology. 
The union officials said they are well informed on overall 
business conditions and the company responds positively when 
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additional information is requested. At Xerox, union and 
management officials are trained jointly in statistics. 
Internal financial documents are shared with the union. At 
National Steel Corporation, "USW officers get data on 
everything from earnings to market conditions--to help see 
what it takes to compete" (Bernstein, 1994). 
CHAPTER 8 
S treamlIning 
Flexibility requires an atmosphere where decisions can 
be made quickly. In a traditional hierarchial organization, 
problems are sent up the chain of command to the appropriate 
decision maker, possibly shifted to another functional area, 
and then passed back to where it originated. During this 
time of indecision, virtually nothing is done to correct the 
problem. Critical time has been wasted and little or no 
value has been added to the product or service. Verbal 
communication may also distort the nature of the problem at 
each step of the decision making process where the "real" 
problem may not be properly identified. An inappropriate 
solution could result, frustrating the workers and customers 
involved. 
Many companies have been eliminating layers of 
management to address this dilemma. Technology is playing a 
vital role in corporate downsizing. The personal computer 
can make information instantly available to anyone who needs 
it. "Management used to mean getting things done through 
others, now it means getting value added" (Higginson and 
Waxier, 1993). As a result, work is being organized around 
processes, not functions or departments. Many layers of 
middle management are eliminated (Bak, 1992). 
When these layers disappear, "decisions get kicked up 
to senior executives, rather than down to first-line 
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supervisors" providing top management with a better 
understanding of the organization's pressing problems 
(Brown, 1992). Union Pacific Railroad executives believe 
that 95 to 99.95 percent of their time is wasted by not 
adding value to their product or service (Peters, 1992). To 
effectively implement a downsizing strategy, "two key 
messages must be articulated by senior management. . . The 
first is here is where we are as a company and this is why 
we can't stay here. The second is: This is what we as a 
company need to become" (Hammer and Champy, 1993). 
According to Cooper, Alladin has eliminated at least 
two layers of management in the production department since 
1981 and in certain areas as many as four layers have been 
cut. When union officials, Russell and Harris, were asked 
about the number of management layers between the worker and 
the CEO, they felt there were about the same or one more, 
but top management was more accessible. 
A philosophical shift occurs in a situation where 
management begins to trust employees. Teamwork is 
encouraged and managers become more participative. They 
realize "workers who are closest to the problems have the 
understanding and knowledge necessary to make all but the 
most nonroutine decisions" (Kearney and Hays, 1994). Who 
reports to whom becomes unimportant. Verifon CEO Hatim 
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Tyabji described their structure "as the blueberry pancake 
model, very flat, with all blueberries equal" (Peters, 
1994) . 
CHAPTER 9 
Labor/Management Relations 
Sustaining TQM efforts in an organization for more than 
a few years is difficult. Initial champions of the effort 
either retire, leave, or get promoted. "Efforts that are 
dependent upon the enthusiasm and skills of a few key people 
are very vulnerable" (Huszczo, 1991). If the TQM philosophy 
is to prevail over the long-term, both management and unions 
must re-evaluate their traditional relationships. 
"[E]ffective collaboration is constructed from a foundation 
of mutual respect and trust--not a simple thing to build in 
the face of years of fierce adversarialism and bitter 
battles across the bargaining table" (Kearney and Hays, 
1994). The adversarial relationship also diverts money from 
other areas which would benefit both parties such as 
organizational development, problem solving, communications, 
training, and productivity improvements (Katz, Kochin and 
Weber, 1985). 
The union proposed the Mid-term review at Alladin. 
Both parties learned to work together on issues of mutual 
concern and interests in the early sessions. As time 
progressed, these discussions have become more substantive. 
According to Tom Bryant, Director of Human Resources, there 
was a common understanding from the outset. They were all 
riding the same train. He also stated, "union officials 
felt uncomfortable with labels such as Quality Circles," a 
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popular term at the time, and leaders felt there was 
potential for management circumvention of the union's role 
as the worker's representative. Alladin still doesn't 
attach a term to their employee participation program. 
According to Cooper and Russell, "It's just a way of life 
and the way we do things around here." 
Both parties should consider that many of their 
historic power roles may undermine the very essence of the 
TQM philosophy. Management rights clauses exist in 
virtually every collective bargaining agreement in the U.S. 
They provide that management can operate the business in any 
manner they deem appropriate if it is not specifically 
negotiated in the contract. These may include plant or 
department closings, work scheduling, sub-contracting 
bargaining unit work, methods of production engineering and 
design of products, types of equipment to be used, etc. 
This is the very system that Deming feels is responsible for 
up to 85% of the business' quality problems. These 
management rights preclude viable input from the union in 
many areas where a team/collaborative approach is desirable. 
"[M]anagement rights. . . doctrine is an enemy of quality 
and high performance in the workplace" (Sheinkman, 1993). 
Top management decides whether TQM will be implemented 
and how. Introducing just-in-time production strategies and 
other TQM approaches will be viewed skeptically by a number 
of groups. Workers and lower level management personnel may 
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fear that they will not be able to cope with the new skills 
and behavior that will be required (Jackson and Frigon, 
1994). Union leaders feel threatened that management will 
usurp the union's role as the worker's representative, 
circumvent the grievance procedure, and make process 
improvements that affect job security (Levine, 1992). Any 
of these groups, workers, union officials, first-line 
supervisors, and middle managers, can subvert the effort 
during the planning or implementation phase by giving lip 
service to it, while not actually doing what is necessary to 
make it succeed. People strongly resent forced change 
(Jackson and Frigon, 1994). 
It is imperative that top management involve all of 
these constituencies to facilitate as much buy-in as 
possible. It is their responsibility to properly train all 
levels of managers and the workers. However, they have no 
obligation to involve union leaders unless they choose. 
Involving union leadership can encourage cooperation by the 
rank and file, if the workers believe management's sincerity 
in allowing them to be partners in the design and 
implementation of the system. 
Union officials, on the other hand, will be required to 
change some long held beliefs. Michael E. Bennett, UAW 
President of Local 1853, predicts that the most successful 
unions in the 1990s will also be the most participatory 
(Levine, 1992) . The AFL-CIO recommended: 
[T]he new work systems require unions to 
embrace an expanded agenda and to assume an 
expanded role as the representative of workers in 
the full range of management decisions in which 
those workers are interested (AFL-CIO, 1994), 
Rapid technological advances in the last decade were 
never envisioned when labor relation laws were enacted in 
the 1930s. These innovations have significant implications 
on the collective bargaining process. Most agreements are 
negotiated for three to four years, with pay scale 
adjustments made during the life of the contract. 
Substantive language remains the same for the duration of 
the contract. In today's rapidly changing global 
marketplace, more flexibility and methods for adjusting the 
contract may be necessary. Charley Richardson of the 
University of Massachusetts maintains: 
Bargaining over technology takes three general 
forms: conditions bargaining, impact bargaining, 
and technology bargaining. Historically, most 
unions have done conditions bargaining, wherein 
conditions of work, pay, advancement, etc. are 
contractually imposed regardless of technological 
change. Impact bargaining... recognizes that 
technology is changing and allows the union the 
right to bargain over the impacts. . .only after 
the major decisions have been made. . . 
Technology bargaining begins from the assumption 
that, at every stage of design, development, and 
implementation, there must be negotiations 
between the company and the union (Richardson, 
1993) . 
The concept of unions negotiating over technology undermines 
the essence of management rights clauses. This has normally 
been management's exclusive privilege and may necessitate a 
new approach in labor/management relations. 
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Organized labor and business leaders have addressed 
this new philosophy in a few recent reports. The Collective 
Bargaining Forum was comprised of corporate executives from 
Xerox, American Airlines, Ford, Kaiser Foundation, Scott 
Paper, Alcoa, CSX, and Ameritech and union presidents from 
the Communication Workers, the Auto Workers, the 
Paperworkers, the Bricklayers, the Clothing and Textile 
Workers, and the Steelworkers. 
The purpose of the forum is to seek ways to improve the 
climate and the conduct of labor-management relations in the 
United States while improving American businesses' 
competitive capabilities with ever increasing global 
competition (Gilmour, 1992) . 
The forum released an initial report in 1988 through 
the U.S. Department of Labor entitled New Directions for 
Labor and Management, A second treatise was released in 
1991 entitled Labor-Management Commitment: A Compact for 
Change. The Compact identifies seven obligations and 
responsibilities to deal with the future of labor bargaining 
relationships. They are: 
"1) American unions and management must accept their joint 
responsibility to work together to improve the economic 
performance of U.S.-based enterprises in ways that serve the 
interests of consumers, stockholders, workers, and society. 
2) Unions can not commit to aid the competitive economic 
performance of companies unless management accepts and 
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supports the legitimate role of unions within the enterprise 
and throughout society as a whole. 
3) Employment security must be taken into account when 
reconciling the tensions between competitiveness and human 
values. 
4) Full employee participation on a sustained basis is 
critical to competing in a changing world. 
5) Conflicting goals must be resolved without destroying or 
jeopardizing the bonds between union and management. 
6) Managements and unions should explore ways to increase 
joint efforts with a sense of immediacy. 
7) Where cooperative efforts to deal with workplace 
problems are not enough to secure competitiveness, it may 
serve the mutual interest of the parties to work together in 
developing joint positions that can be used in seeking the 
participation of executive and legislative branches of 
government, both federal and state" (Gilmour, 1992). 
In February 1994, the AFL-CIO released a monograph, 
compiled by its Committee on the Evolution of Work, entitled 
The New American Workplace: A Labor Perspective. 
This committee was comprised of top union officials from 
about thirty of America's most powerful unions. It 
reiterated many of the points made by the Collective 
Bargaining Forum and went on to recommend that the AFL-CIO 
"should take the initiative in convening conferences and 
seminars for trade unionists to share experiences, to teach 
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and learn from each other" (AFL-CIO, 1994). If 
collaborative efforts become as widespread as these studies 
indicate, labor/management relations could see the most 
drastic change in our history. 
Whether management involves the union at the beginning 
or later on is their choice. Once empowerment or 
involvement programs are established, union leaders should 
establish a parallel structure which has the proper 
safeguards in place. This might be negotiated in the 
contract or a side-letter of agreement. As Irving Bluestone 
stated when these programs are unilaterally implemented, 
"what management gives, management can take away." 
Professor George Strauss at the University of California 
stated, "[Ujnless the new system is embedded in law, as in 
the form of a union contract, the majority of employee 
involvement programs will be dead in four years" (Brown, 
1992). By acknowledging collaboration in a formal 
agreement, "neither party is likely to ask for their 
removal, even when interest in the activities is waning" 
(Huszczo, 1991) . Both parties are more likely to focus on 
long-term competitiveness rather than short-term financial 
performance. Many companies have acknowledged the benefit 
of involving the union in these efforts. "The presence of 
the union at Xerox strengthened the process of change, 
provided continuity in the face of management turnover, and 
provided a constant pressure for management to be 
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accountable to its work force" (Sheinkman, 1993). 
Rubinstein discovered formalized agreements on quality are 
starting to become more common. 
Appendix Q of the collective bargaining 
agreement between the United Auto Workers and 
Ford Motor Company provides for joint leadership 
in the quality improvement effort. Provisions are 
made for union-management joint quality 
committees at corporate, division, and facility 
levels. These committees have the authority of 
the contract to jointly plan, implement, 
evaluate, and expand quality systems as needed. 
That kind of commitment cannot be easily changed 
by a change in management or, for that matter, a 
change in union leadership (Rubinstein, 1993). 
During the 1992 negotiations at AT&T, both union and 
management recognized the fast-paced and dramatic change in 
the marketplace, technology, and competition required a 
different relationship. Cooperation and collaboration 
should replace the adversarial labor-management relationship 
to assure the survival of both the company and the union 
(Stuart, 1993). A greater number of companies acknowledge 
that their success in quality systems can be credited to the 
union. "Enlightened managers are providing a receptive 
environment and the unions are providing the competitive 
edge. It is now critical for labor relations attitudes in 
this country to shift" (Rubinstein, 1993) . 
The collective bargaining agreement between Alladin and 
the United Steelworkers of America local 4 802 does not 
contain language regarding their employee involvement 
programs. Cooper stated they try to keep contractual 
language as simple as possible and if any party has concerns 
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about specific language during the life of the contract, 
these are discussed. If the parties agree to a change, the 
new interpretation will be honored until the next contract 
negotiations when the language is modified. 
Both parties must retain certain rights in this 
cooperative environment. Identifying those areas where both 
sides agree to cooperate while not sacrificing traditional 
power roles can be an arduous task. "[P]arties choosing to 
cooperate must fashion relationships that effectively 
balance cooperation and conflict. Cooperation does not 
mean. . . that unions and employers are expected to 
relinquish their relative power or their primary end goals" 
(Cooke, 1991). Conflicts will continue to exist. That does 
not mean that union/management relations must be 
contentious. The AFL-CIO envisions partnerships where these 
conflicts are addressed in "an atmosphere of mutual respect, 
trust and good will" (AFL-CIO, 1994). Indeed, many unions 
have continued adversarial relations at the bargaining 
table, representing their member's best interests, while 
cooperating and embracing TQM philosophy on the shop floor 
(Business Week, 1981, and Myers and Killeen, 1994). 
Cooperation does not mean unions will relinquish their 
grievance procedure rights. But the hostile attitude during 
grievance meetings may change to one of more open dialogue 
when the parties are accustomed to working cooperatively on 
other matters. Alladin union officials Joe Russell and 
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Charlotte Harris, Chairperson of the Grievance Committee 
confirmed this. They both attended a grievance meeting the 
day before our interview. Both felt each party openly 
expressed their concerns and both sides listened. They feel 
the number of grievances have declined and those that do 
proceed are resolved more quickly with fewer going to final 
arbitration. 
One reason unions may be instrumental in sustaining 
quality programs is the existence of the grievance 
procedure. Non-union firms typically do not have a formal 
process for resolving conflicts between workers and 
management, where 99 percent of unionized firms have 
contractual grievance language and 95 percent provide for 
third party arbitration if disputes are not satisfactorily 
settled between the two parties (Freeman and Medoff, 1979). 
When one side dictates the rules, policies and objectives of 
involvement, maintaining worker's commitment to continuous 
improvement is extremely difficult. 
CHAPTER 10 
Partnerships 
Forging partnerships between unions and management can 
strengthen the competitive position of the company, therefor 
increasing long-term job security for the workers. In 
numerous companies the TQM effort was initially proposed by 
unions. The United Autoworkers' Irving Bluestone initially 
proposed the possibility of a joint union-management QWL 
committee. General Motors declined to participate. A large 
number of GM executives felt QWL was another passing fad, or 
worse, a capitulation of management rights to the union 
(Beer, et al, 1985). At Corning, management initially began 
the program in 1982 but it did not prosper until 1989 when 
both sides drew up company goals. The union first 
encouraged TQM "but it never would have worked if management 
had not demonstrated clearly its good faith by putting up 
millions of dollars for training" (Waxier and Higginson, 
1992). Traditional adversarial positions have been 
abandoned by both parties to facilitate cooperation and 
collaboration. Managements have agreed not to oppose union 
representational drives at new plants in a number of 
instances. Corning built two new facilities "that were 
immediately filled with union employees, thus saving the 
union money by avoiding a costly union organizing campaign 
and immediately creating an environment of trust" (Waxier 
and Higginson, 1992). In 1979, GM agreed to "a preferential 
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transfer policy for unionized workers who wished to move 
into the new Southern plants. . . virtually assuring the 
UAW's victory in all ensuing representational elections" 
(Beer, et al, 1985). 
Forming union/management partnerships is not so radical 
as it might first appear. Joint partnerships have existed 
for many years in numerous areas of human relations such as 
safety and health or training. "Virtually every function 
(except discipline) traditionally managed by a 
Personnel/Human Resources Department has become a joint 
program in some organization in this country today" 
(Huszczo, 1991). Treating unions as equal partners in areas 
which determine the long-term viability of the company gives 
them an opportunity to help shape the future of the company. 
These areas include engineering and product design, work 
processes, capital expenditures, and new technology. 
(Applebaum and Batt, 1993) . Unions have complained about 
having to suffer the effects of mismanagement. Being an 
equal partner will enable them to have more input on 
critical decisions affecting their job security (Huszczo, 
1991). 
Partnerships in cooperative efforts are at record 
levels in this country. About half of all unionized 
facilities have joint union/management programs in place 
(Cooke, 1991, and Applebaum and Batt, 1993) . United 
Steelworkers President Lynn Williams stated in late 1993: 
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As I write this, the United Steelworkers of 
America has achieved the first of its New 
Directions agreements with the Inland Steel 
Company. It is truly a joint accomplishment, 
with a new partnership that provides: 
* Full worker involvement across the company with 
information and effective participation at every 
level 
* Training of workers and managers, together and 
separately, in the skills and understanding 
required in this new approach 
* Restructuring and modernization within the 
framework of employment security 
* A new level of guarantee by the company that, 
whatever the future holds, its obligations to its 
employees will be met 
* Recognition of the union as a quality 
organization, its need to exist, and its right to 
seek representational authority in areas where it 
does not exist (Williams, 1993). 
This agreement conforms with the four general 
guidelines advanced by the AFL-CIO's Committee on the 
Evolution of Work. Williams was a member. They are: 
First, we seek partnerships based on mutual 
recognition and respect. 
Second, and in accordance with the concept of 
recognition and respect, the partnerships we seek 
must be based on the collective bargaining 
relationship. 
Third, the partnerships must be founded on the 
principle of equality. In concrete terms, this 
means that unions and management must have an 
equal role in the development and implementation 
of new work systems, including equal 
representation and control over any bodies 
created as part of the work reorganization. 
Fourth, the partnerships must be dedicated to 
advancing certain agreed-upon goals reflecting 
the parties' mutual interests. . . .successful 
partnerships must be dedicated to achieving both 
more productive and more democratic and humane 
workplaces (AFL-CIO, 1994). 
Lastly, if these relationships are to succeed, 
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management must consult with unions on all reductions in 
workforce matters, including sub-contracting of bargaining 
unit work, and allow the union to evaluate previous sub­
contracting decisions. Reductions in force is the major 
reason cooperative efforts are abandoned (Sharp, 1991). 
CHAPTER 11 
Effects of Participation in Union 
and Nonunion Environments 
Employee participation programs exist in a variety of 
settings: non-union operations, unionized operations where 
programs are implemented and administrated by management, or 
in unionized settings where joint committees of executives 
and union leaders direct the programs. 
By definition, partnerships cannot exist in non-union 
facilities because there is no recognized group officially 
representing the workers. There may be certain workers 
viewed by their peers as leaders, but these individuals have 
no legal standing, as their union counterparts do. In non­
union operations, sustaining EI programs is dependant on a 
few influential individuals. These people leave for a 
variety of reasons and the program's support tends to leave 
with them. Sidney Rubinstein, a team consultant for labor 
and management since the 1950s, estimates "four-fifths of 
unionless programs fail" (Noble, 1993). Many feel that it 
takes extraordinary management in non-union environments to 
promote and sustain EI because individual managers can 
develop their own departmental agenda, which may be 
inconsistent with top management's intention. In this 
situation, top management must discover, on their own, which 
managers are undermining their objectives. The workers may 
not fully understand these objectives, since the goals may 
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have been conveyed by these same unsupportive managers. "In 
a union setting, the union is present to point out the 
concerns of employees when individual managers are not 
supporting the program" (Sharp, 1991). 
Programs controlled exclusively by management, in 
either union or non-union environments, violate fundamental 
tenets of TQM philosophy and may be the reason 80% of TQM 
efforts fail. One of Deming's fourteen points was the 
elimination of fear in the workplace (See Appendix C, 
Deming's 14 Points). Eliminating fear empowers employees 
who are not reluctant to make suggestions and identify 
systematic problems (Gilbert, 1992). Union membership 
provides workers with a certain level of protection when 
they openly disagree with supervisors. This can promote 
respect and trust. Trust flows both ways. When workers 
aren't trusted to cooperate in the design, direction, and 
establishment of priorities in TQM then it really isn't TQM. 
When employees don't have a true voice in the process, 
sustaining worker's commitment over several years is 
difficult and most likely the attempt for continuous 
improvement will vanish. When "unions are excluded from or 
choose not to assist in administering programs, 
participation activities yield no gain in quality" (Cooke, 
1991). However, when unions attempt to sabotage 
participation efforts, there is no significant correlation 
with program survival rates. This interesting finding by 
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Adrienne Eaton suggests, "that although the lack of union 
commitment may hurt a program, active attempts to get rid of 
the program tend to have no such effect, a conclusion many-
trade unionists would probably find disturbing" (Eaton, 
1994) . 
In those situations where the union is asked to 
participate in administering the programs, Cooke found that: 
[E]stablishments with jointly administered 
programs achieve quality improvements 
substantially greater than those achieved through 
either management-controlled programs or 
traditional collective bargaining relationships 
that exclude direct participation activities 
(Cooke, 1992) . 
There are certain situations where union involvement 
has yielded little or no benefit. A more experienced 
workforce tends to resist team efforts because of long­
standing work rules and certain privileges accruing with 
seniority. More senior workers may not want to perform some 
of the mundane tasks associated with less senior positions 
which are still necessary procedures in the team-based 
approach (Cooke, 1990). Another situation which hinders the 
survival of the programs is when multiple unions are 
represented in the same facility. Each one is likely to 
have different approaches to collaboration "making their 
administration more complex" (Eaton, 1994). 
The most successful Employee Involvement efforts have 
several common traits. First, traditional management power 
is replaced with employee responsibility and a focus on the 
71 
customer. Second, communication channels are redefined and 
traditional organization boundaries are adjusted. Third, 
significant attention is paid to activities which increase 
trust, mutual respect, and commitment. Fourth, an 
understanding that improvements in processes won't translate 
into job loss. Fifth, both union and management 
representatives are active participants on all coordinating 
committees. And last and certainly not least, the 
participation is institutionalized by formal language in the 
collective bargaining agreement or in a side-letter 
agreement. 
Early studies examining the impact on companies' 
economic performance with Quality of Work Life, Employee 
Involvement, Quality Circles, or Total Quality Management 
programs were mixed. In 1985, Katz and others revealed two 
somewhat contradictory findings. The first was that "hourly 
workers' involvement in QWL programs has no impact on 
economic performance." They also found a "positive 
association between comparatively high levels of hourly 
workers' involvement in QWL programs and relatively high 
level of direct labor efficiency and product quality" (Katz, 
Kochan and Weber, 1985). Their study evaluated 25 
manufacturing facilities of a large durable goods 
manufacturer for the period 1978-1980. They did not specify 
how long these programs were in effect at the different 
plants nor did they address how these plants compared with 
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competitors during the economic recession which existed at 
the time. TQM concepts have advanced a great deal since the 
time of this study. And the programs may not have existed 
for the five or six years it takes to realize significant 
benefits. 
Subsequent studies have revealed different results. In 
1986, William Cooke conducted a study comparing the results 
of firms pursuing cooperative teamwork and those pursuing an 
adversarial approach in unionized settings. His 
measurement, value added, was defined as operating income 
plus inventory divided by the number of workers. He 
compared the results of the two different approaches over a 
decade. He found those companies pursuing a cooperative 
teamwork approach reported a 19% increase in value added 
while combative firms reported a 15% decline. The 34% 
difference represents a significant cost to those firms 
seeking union avoidance tactics (Bernstein, 1991, and Waxier 
and Higginson, 1992). 
In 1990, Cooke studied employee/supervisor 
relationships. He reported when there is substantial union 
leader membership on the top steering committees 
employee/supervisor relations showed greater improvement 
than when they were not well represented. He also found 
team-based programs meeting weekly yielded "substantially 
greater improvements in employee/supervisor relations than 
either less active teams or committee-based programs" 
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(Cooke, 1990). 
In 1991, Cooke determined that "jointly-administered 
participation programs (but not unilaterally administered 
programs) in unionized firms lead to quality improvements 
equivalent to, if not slightly greater than, participation 
programs in nonunion firms." He surmised that "the key to 
unleashing positive union effects is through the joint 
administration of participation programs." He also found, 
"Where unions are excluded from or choose not to assist in 
administering programs, participation activities yielded no 
gains in quality" (Cooke, 1991). 
Cooke researched participation programs again in 1992 
comparing the three different environments: unionized firms 
with jointly administered programs, unionized firms with 
unilaterally managed programs and non-union organizations. 
He found that workers in non-union or unionized firms, with 
sole management control of the program, received only the 
information management believed they needed to know. In 
jointly administered programs, union leaders were in a 
better position to obtain additional information they felt 
was necessary to make informed decisions. Union officials 
may interpret the information differently than management, 
leading to a broader discussion of potential solutions. 
Union leaders have better access to top management when 
proposals are blocked or ignored by lower level managers. 
In non-union environments, workers have very little access 
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to top management. Jointly-administered programs provide 
the framework for indoctrinating new managers in the 
participation principles when the ground rules are clearly 
understood (Cooke, 1992). "Unions have a positive effect on 
quality circles. . . the average survival rate of circles 
increased from 65 percent in nonunion firms to 91 percent in 
unionized firms" (Levine, 1992) . Both Bryant and Cooper of 
Alladin feel there are certain advantages in dealing with 
unions. Supervisors can't make up their own rules and a 
structure exists where everyone knows what to expect. 
EI programs are implemented intending to improve 
product quality, increase worker's commitment to their jobs, 
reduce turnover and absenteeism, facilitate improved 
communication and cooperation between workers and 
management, broaden worker's skills, and improve labor 
relations. If these objectives were to be realized, rework 
would decline significantly, inventories and safety stocks 
would be virtually eliminated, market share should increase, 
processes would be fine-tuned, grievances would decline, and 
negotiations at contract time would go more smoothly. 
At Alladin the contract has been re-negotiated at least 
four times since forming the union-management committee. 
All parties agreed that grievances have declined. Rework is 
minimal, an incredible $4200 of re-work performed on a $15 
million production budget over the past three months. 
Productivity is up. Management officials said employee 
75 
turnover is about the same while the union leaders said it 
was down. Everyone felt negotiations went more smoothly and 
took less time. The number of issues remained about the 
same but they swept unimportant issues aside quickly getting 
down to "brass tacks earlier." 
In Katz' 1985 study, he stated: 
The more telling test is whether industry can 
maintain positive effects through a complete 
cycle of contract negotiations, negotiation of 
changes in local work rules, and turnover of key 
management or union decision makers; also telling 
are events in an even broader context--for 
instance, engagement of management and union 
officials in major bargains over strategic issues 
like the organization of new plants or 
reinvestment of resources in existing plants 
(Katz, et al, 1985). 
In the late 8 0s and early 90s, as these programs 
matured, many of these concerns were addressed. Most 
notably by The Collective Bargaining Forum in 1988 and 1991 
and the AFL-CIO's Committee on the Evolution of Work in 
1994. The Carnegie Mellon Institute found in a recent study 
that, "Non-union factories with employee involvement 
programs are 34.9% less productive than union factories with 
no formal programs at all" (Waxier and Higginson, 1992). 
"[N]onunion workplaces with joint labor-management problem-
solving committees are significantly less efficient and less 
likely to provide employment security than is a traditional 
union-based system" (Kelley and Harrison, 1992, and 
Thornburg, 1993). The researchers found that for TQM 
programs to be successful in large, multi-facility companies 
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the support of the union is essential. There has been a 
general perception that unionized facilities are less cost 
effective than their non-union competitors because of higher 
wages. However, "more than 50 quantitative studies have 
concluded that the higher productivity of unionized 
companies offsets most of their higher costs" (Bernstein, 
1994). When the union is directly involved in the 
administration of the programs "workers are more likely to 
participate aggressively and without fear through their own 
organization than through a system dependent solely on 
management's goodwill" (Sheinkman, 1993). 
Many academicians, business executives and labor 
leaders are realizing significant benefits of jointly-
administered programs. "[M]any of the best-practice cases 
of team production involve unionized workplaces; and 
managers in these companies argue it is precisely the 
combination of human resource practices and partnership 
processes with unions that makes the decisive difference" 
(Applebaum and Batt, 1993). USW President Lynn Williams 
predicted participation programs in non-union environments 
won't survive very long because the workers don't have a say 
in how the gains are shared, unlike their union counterparts 
(Noble, 1993) . Recently, more publicity has focused on 
American businesses benefiting from these new management 
approaches. Success stories from Ford, Xerox, AT&T, Scott 
Paper, National Steel and others have encouraged diverse 
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industries and their respective unions "to collaborate daily 
on everything from work assignments to marketing 
strategies." One such attempt at GM's Saturn Corp. has 
redefined roles for managers and union leaders. " [T]earns of 
workers largely govern themselves and union officials are 
involved at every level of management" (Bernstein, 1994). 
This new paradigm requires fundamental changes in the 
leaders' and workers' roles. Both parties have great stakes 
in the outcome--survival. If the participation programs are 
implemented properly and are to be sustained for more than a 
few years, unions must be treated as equal partners. When 
company profits increase from improved productivity and cost 
reductions, there will be a greater economic pie enabling 
the union to negotiate more favorable collective bargaining 
agreements (Sharp, 1991). 
Many people have questioned whether TQM is just 
another passing fad. TQM is not a program but a new 
philosophy. It is far more encompassing than many of its 
predecessors and requires a new way of working and thinking. 
Covey believes we can't just work faster if the system is 
the cause for poor quality. If we work faster and harder, 
we will just produce more of the same inferior products. 
The system needs to be fixed and a new "road map" developed. 
Much of that system is based on Taylorism which most agree 
has outlived its usefulness in a highly competitive global 
marketplace (Covey, 1990). 
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In 1994, Adrienne E. Eaton examined survival rates of 
participation programs in unionized settings. She compared 
data from two different surveys and found that the failure 
rate ran between 20-30%. This is significantly below the 
commonly accepted failure rate, anywhere between 70-80%, in 
participation programs after two or three years. Her 
research covered 86 bargaining units in companies with 
participative programs in early 1987 with a follow-up survey 
in 1990 of the same worksites. She proposed: 
[A]Ithough there was no steady increase in the 
number of program starts from year to year, the 
number of programs did jump after 1985. This 
pattern suggests either that six years is a more 
natural half-life than the three to five years 
often mentioned by observers or that the "fad" of 
participation took a major leap after 1985 
(Eaton, 1994). 
Cooke asserted that "the perceived improvement in 
relations begins to wane after three years and levels off 
after six years" (Cooke, 1990). 
Eaton also found the "perspectives of managers and 
union representatives differed sharply." She observed that 
union leaders "viewed a good labor relations climate as 
essential to program viability," but management respondents 
did not. Both parties agreed that union commitment was a 
decisive factor in program survival and management 
respondents felt "top management's commitment as vitally 
important." Managers, on the average, didn't think 
strategies that conflicted with the union's best interest 
might diminish the union's commitment to the program, such 
79 
as concession bargaining or other management power plays. 
There was also a different perspective regarding outcomes of 
the program. 
The changes resulting from the program that 
were most often mentioned were those more often 
identified with management goals than with union 
goals: improved productivity, reduced production 
costs, and improved quality. Much less often 
mentioned were improved labor relations, 
avoidance of layoffs and plant closings, and 
better working conditions and worker morale, 
matters likely to be of more concern to labor 
than to management (Eaton, 1994). 
It is understandable both parties don't view the programs 
identically. These are innovative approaches attempting to 
radically change the workplace based on over a century of 
mistrust, adversity, and confrontation. Developing a 
corporate culture focusing on the customer and based on 
mutual respect, trust, collaboration, and continuous 
improvement will take some time. But it does appear many 
companies and their unions are making very serious advances. 
If this continues, it will mark a new era of 
labor/management relations in the United States. "The 1990s 
could prove a revolutionary--and transforming--decade for 
the American labor movement" (Nulty, 1993). 
CHAPTER 12 
A Look to the Future 
There are many skeptics who question if TQM is just 
another fad that will soon disappear. New concepts are 
introduced continually. Some of the latest are re-
engineering, learning organizations, and principle centered 
leadership programs (Peters, 1994, Senge, 1990, and Covey 
1990). However, they all build upon the same basic 
principles of focusing on customers, involving and trusting 
employees, and redefining processes rather than functions. 
Bill Cooper of Alladin Industries correctly questions 
whether these new concepts aren't the product of consultants 
and trainers colluding on how to keep executives in a 
constant state of training. This might be true, but the 
common principles mentioned above are here to stay. 
The American worker today is one of the best educated 
in our history. Democracy in the work environment may be 
the best method to retain and develop loyal employees. 
Involving workers in routine decisions and treating their 
leaders as equal partners in administering programs, creates 
a climate where everyone is familiar with the organization's 
goals, resources, and priorities. In this environment, 
"involved employees are able to shake off more quickly the 
anxiety and distractions that often accompany downsizing and 
threaten productivity" (Niven, et al, 1993) . 
Many skeptics of TQM believed that American workers can 
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not adapt to a management philosophy pioneered in Japan. 
Our ideology of rewarding rugged individualism, star 
performers, and adversarialism is contrary to team-oriented 
approaches. However, numerous companies in this country 
have attained world-class quality proving it can be done in 
our society. These role models are sharing their 
experiences with others and the momentum continues to build 
(Juran, 1994). These new attitudes are filtering "into 
industries as diverse as farm equipment, autos, electrical 
equipment, garments, mining, paper, steel and 
telecommunications" (Bernstein, 1994). 
Most companies concede that Taylor's scientific 
management model is obsolete and needs replacing. What to 
replace it with is the major challenge. Juran identified 
four options which include: 
* Creating the conditions for worker self-control 
* Creating the conditions for worker self-inspection 
* Job enlargement, both horizontal and vertical 
* Self-directed teams 
All of these have been attempted in numerous settings. 
Each, however, "involves extensive transfer of work from 
supervisors and specialists to the work force" (Juran, 
1994). Each option involves a major reorganization of the 
workplace. 
There is a general consensus that all three sectors of 
commerce, manufacturing, service, and government, need to be 
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more responsive to consumers. Bureaucratic red-tape needs 
to be eliminated. Proponents of change are suggesting two 
methods of accomplishing a more flexible, responsive, and 
knowledgeable workforce. The first, is systematically-
developing a corporate plan to implement TQM. This involves 
establishing a steering committee which administers the 
overall program. The steering committee appoints pilot 
teams to address specific problems. When the pilot teams 
succeed, other teams are formed and gradually the program 
expands throughout the firm. 
Tom Peters and others suggest a more drastic approach. 
They contend that incremental expansion of TQM in today's 
competitive environment is too slow. They propose swift and 
all-encompassing change. They feel an old Chinese proverb 
is appropriate: "It is very dangerous to try to leap a chasm 
in two bounds" (Peters, 1994). Most firms are too tentative 
in their corporate reorganizations and are not succeeding. 
Asea Brown Boveri CEO Percy Barnevik says, "you have to 
accept a fair share of mistakes, but I'd rather be roughly 
right and fast than exactly right and slow" (Peters, 1992). 
Whatever method is utilized, the workforce needs to be 
prepared for rapid change. Most union members and their 
leaders understand participation is the future. What they 
must decide is "under what conditions and how" they want to 
be involved. "Participation puts major new demands on the 
administrative, leadership, and technical capabilities of 
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unions in a period of dramatically reduced organizational 
and financial resources" (Applebaum and Batt, 1993) . This 
could be where the AFL-CIO's proposed resource and training 
program will prove beneficial for financially troubled 
unions. 
Unions will continue to exist. Membership levels had 
declined significantly in the 1980s but cooperation rather 
than adversarialism seems to be gaining hold. If companies 
abandon union avoidance techniques and recognize the 
legitimate role of unions, former non-union facilities could 
become unionized. The Clinton administration has toned down 
the anti-union rhetoric of the recent past but labor lost 
much clout. That could be changing. "The decline in union 
membership has reversed. In 1993, union membership roles 
swelled by 200,000, the first increase in 14 years" 
(Associated Press, 1994). 
Technological breakthroughs will continue at a 
staggering pace. Personal computers today have the speed 
and sophistication of main frame computers just ten years 
ago. The ability to access information immediately will 
significantly impact the way work is performed in the 
future. Managers who acted as information relay points in 
the hierarchial structure will share information instantly 
with the workers who will want more say in how to perform 
their jobs most effectively. 
CHAPTER 13 
Conclusion 
If Juran's prediction that the 21st century will be 
known as the Century of Quality is realized, a new paradigm 
of work organization must be achieved. It appears TQM 
provides the proper principles to realize a new 
collaborative model. However, an appropriate labor-
management spirit must exist. When adversarial relations 
exist that preclude joint decision making, management seems 
unable, on average, to tap the full potential of employee 
input (Cooke, 1992). When a cooperative spirit exists, and 
the "unions have the organizational capacity and leadership 
to become involved in production decisions, they appear to 
provide an organizational asset not available in nonunion 
settings" (Applebaum and Batt, 1993). 
To sustain TQM for more than a few years requires 
strong commitment from both management and unions. 
Treating each other as equal partners appears to be the most 
effective way to realize continuous improvement. "[T]here 
is research that shows that workers who judge a 
participative program as successful tend to credit both the 
union and management, whereas those who see the program as a 
failure blame management for its lack of success" (Levine, 
1992). 
Research results have been mixed on the effectiveness 
of participatory programs on companies' performance when 
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comparing collaborative and adversarial approaches. The 
most recent studies show collaboration has significant 
positive effects on labor relations and performance. Cooke 
aptly points out, "One can surmise that unless plant-level 
collaborative activities. . . yield greater overall 
performance outcomes than adversarial activities, those 
companies engaged in collaboration will be forced to abandon 
their collaborative efforts. Conversely, if collaboration 
is successful, adversaries may be forced into collaboration, 
or else face their own demise" (Cooke, 1990). 
While adversarial relations between unions and 
management violate the very character of TQM philosophy, 
jointly administered programs appear to be the most 
effective method of ensuring TQM survival. Top union 
officials recognize the importance of cooperation and are 
currently addressing the training needs of local union 
leaders on the most successful techniques being practiced 
today. Business executives recognize that competing in the 
global marketplace requires world class quality products or 
services. Achieving these objectives requires a new 
paradigm in the workplace. Those companies which pursue 
strong partnerships between management and union employees 
will probably be among the 20% who see their TQM efforts 
succeed. 
APPENDIXES 
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APPENDIX A 
Juran's Categories of Quality Costs 
Internal failure costs=costs from product defects before 
shipment to the customer. They include the following: 
* Scrap--net losses in labor and material resulting from 
defective goods that cannot economically be repaired 
or used. 
* Rework--costs of correcting defective products to make 
them usable. 
* Retest--costs of reinspection and retesting of 
products that have been reworked. 
* Downtime--costs of idle facilities, equipment, and 
labor due to defective products. 
* Yield losses--cost of process yields lower than could 
be attained through improved process control. 
* Disposition--the time of those involved in determining 
whether nonconforming products are usable and what 
should be done with them. 
External failure costs=costs associated with defects found 
after shipment to customer. They include the following: 
* Complaint adjustment--cost of investigating and 
responding to complaints due to defective products, 
faulty installation, or improper instructions to 
users. 
* Returned material--costs associated with receiving and 
replacing defective products returned from the field. 
* Warranty charges--costs of services and repairs 
performed under warranty contracts. 
* Allowances--income losses due to downgrading products 
for sale as seconds and to concessions made to 
customers who accept substandard products as is. 
Appraisal costs=costs associated with discovering the 
condition of products and raw materials. They include the 
following: 
* Incoming materials inspection--costs associated with 
determining the quality of vendors' products. 
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* Inspection and test--cost of checking product 
conformance throughout design and manufacture, 
including test done on costumers' premises. 
* Maintaining accuracy of test equipment--costs of 
operating and maintaining measuring instruments. 
* Materials and services consumed--cost of products 
consumed in destructive tests; also materials and 
services (e.g., electrical power) consumed in testing. 
* Evaluation of stocks--costs of testing products in 
storage to assess their condition. 
Prevention costs=costs associated with preventing defects 
and limiting failure and appraisal costs. They include the 
following: 
* Quality planning--costs of creating and communicating 
plans and data systems for quality, 
inspection,reliability, and related activities--
includes the costs of preparing all necessary manuals 
and procedures. 
* New products review--costs of preparing bid proposals, 
evaluating new designs, preparing test and 
experimentation programs, and related activities 
associated with launching new products. 
* Training--costs of developing and conducting training 
programs aimed at improving quality performance. 
* Process control--costs of process control aimed at 
achieving fitness for use, as distinguished form 
productivity (a difficult distinction to make in 
practice). 
* Quality data acquisition and analysis--costs of 
operating the quality data system to get continuing 
data on quality performance. 
* Quality Reporting--cost of bringing together and 
presenting quality data to upper management. 
Improvement projects--costs of building and 
implementing breakthrough projects. 
Note: This a summary and rewording of Juran and Gryna, 
Quality Planning, pp. 14-16. 
Source: Harvard Business School Case Study, 9-687-011, 
Note on Quality: The Views of Deming, Juran, and Crosby. 
1986. 
APPENDIX B 
CEO's Nondelegable Roles 
"There are seven steps that a responsible CEO must take 
to achieve quality in any organization. They are strikingly 
similar to the steps that CEO's already routinely take in 
managing for financial results. To lead a revolution for 
quality, every CEO must: 
* Set up and serve on the company's quality council, 
the quality equivalent of the finance committee. 
* Establish corporate quality goals, including quality 
improvement goals, and make them part of the business 
plan. 
* Make provisions for training the entire company 
hierarchy in managing for quality. 
* Establish the means to measure quality results against 
quality goals. 
* Review results against goals on a regular basis. 
* Give recognition for superior quality performance. 
* Revise the reward system to respond to the changes 
demanded by world-class quality." 
Reference 
J.M. Juran, "Made in the USA--A Renaissance in Quality," 
Harvard Business Review, July-August 1993. 
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APPENDIX C 
Deming's 14 Points 
1. Create constancy of purpose for improvement of product 
and service.® Management must change from a 
preoccupation with the short run to building for the 
long run. This requires dedication to innovation in 
all areas to best meet the needs of customers. 
2. Adopt the new philosophy. Shoddy materials, poor 
workmanship, defective products, and lax service must 
become unacceptable. 
3. Cease dependence on mass inspection. Inspection is 
equivalent to planning for defects; it comes too late 
and is ineffective and costly. Instead, processes 
must be improved. 
4. End the practice of awarding business on price tag 
alone. Price has no meaning without a measure of the 
quality being purchased. Therefore, the job of 
purchasing will change only after management 
establishes new guidelines. Companies must develop 
long-term relationships and work with fewer suppliers. 
Purchasing must be given statistical tools to judge 
the quality of vendors and purchased parts. Both 
purchasing and vendors must understand specifications, 
but they must also know how the material is to be used 
in production and by the final costumer. 
5. Constantly and forever improve the system of 
production and service. Waste must be reduced and 
quality improved in every activity: procurement, 
transportation, engineering, methods, maintenance, 
sales, distribution, accounting, payroll, customer 
service, and manufacturing. Improvement, however, 
does not come from studying the defects produced by a 
process that is in control but from studying the 
process itself. Most of the responsibility for 
process improvement rests with management. 
6. Institute modern methods of training on the job. 
Training must be restructured and centered on clearly 
defined concepts of acceptable work. Statistical 
methods must be used for deciding when training has 
been completed successfully. 
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7. Institute modern methods of supervising. Supervisors 
must be empowered to inform upper management about 
conditions that need correction; once informed, 
management must take action. Barriers that prevent 
hourly workers from doing their jobs with pride must 
be removed. 
8. Drive out fear. Because of the tremendous economic 
losses cause by fear on the job, people must not be 
afraid to ask questions, to report problems, or to 
express ideas. 
9. Break down barriers between departments. Members of 
the research, design, procurement, sales, and 
receiving departments must learn about problems with 
raw materials and specifications in production and 
assembly. Each discipline must stop optimizing its 
own work and instead work together as a team for the 
company as a whole. Multidisciplinary quality-control 
circles can help improve design, service, quality, and 
costs. 
10. Eliminate numerical goals for the work force. 
Targets, slogans, pictures, and posters urging people 
to increase productivity must be eliminated. Most of 
the necessary changes are out of workers' control, so 
such exhortations merely cause resentment. Although 
workers should not be given numerical goals, the 
company itself must have a goal; never-ending 
improvement. 
11. Eliminate work standards and numerical quotas. Quotas 
focus on quantity, not quality. Therefore, work 
standards practically guarantee poor quality and high 
costs. Work standards that state percentage-defective 
or scrap goals normally reach those targets but never 
exceed them. Piecework is even worse, for it pays 
people for building defective units. But if someone's 
pay is docked for defective units, that is unfair, for 
the worker did not create the defects. 
12. Remove barriers that hinder the hourly workers. Any 
barrier that hinders pride in work must be removed, 
including not knowing what good work is, supervisors 
motivated by quotas, off-gauge parts and material, and 
no response to reports of out-of-order machines. 
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13. Institute a vigorous program of education and 
training. Because quality and productivity-
improvements change the number of people needed in 
some areas and the jobs required, people must be 
continually trained and retrained. All training must 
include basic statistical techniques. 
14. Create a structure in top management that will push 
every day on the above 13 points. 
a. Deming's words are in bold headings. The remainder of 
each paragraph paraphrases his discussions. 
Source: Harvard Business School Case Study, 9-687-011, "A 
Note on Quality: The Views of Deming, Juran, and Crosby," 
1986 . 
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